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UNIMPOUNDMENT: POLITICS AND THE COURTS
IN THE RELEASE OF IMPOUNDED FUNDS*
by Jon L. Mills" and William G. Munselle***
During the administration of President Nixon, the impoundment of funds
appropriated by the Congress became not merely a means of executive econ-
omy but a tool of presidential politics. Non-judicial methods of unimpound-
ment lost their efficacy, and the courts became involved in the conflict be-
tween the President and the Congress in resolving the question of whether
impoundment was either constitutionally or legislatively proscribed. Mr. Mills
and Professor Munselle examine the process of unimpoundment both as a
political phenomenon and as a legal issue. They survey the extra-judicial
means of unimpoundment and then consider the resolution of that issue in the
courts, particularly as affected by the recent decision of the Supreme Court
in Train v. New York. Finally, they discuss the implications of the recently
enacted Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, particularly as it
affects the judicial process of unimpoundment. Their conclusions suggest that
the Act has formalized both methods of unimpoundment and that the resolu-
tion of budgetary conflicts between the President and the Congress will con-
tinue in both political and judicial arenas.
INTRODUCTION
In 1965 Professor Arthur Miller stated that the power of presiden-
tial impoundment could be exercised "to the extent that the politi-
cal milieu in which he [the President] operates permits him to do
so."' Although federal courts were a part of that milieu in 1965, they
had not yet become actively involved in the impoundment contro-
versy. At that time disputes concerning impoundment were resolved
by, or at least were limited to, the executive branch and Congress
without the intervention of courts.2 Apparently, the severity of im-
poundments and the degree of animosity they engendered had not
* This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Center for Governmental Responsi-
bility, Holland Law Center, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida; funding for the Center
is provided by the McIntosh Foundation. The authors acknowledge editorial assistance pro-
vided by Linda Barnett, Assistant Director, Center for Governmental Responsibility. The
views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to any other person
or institution.
**Director, Center for Governmental Responsibility, Holland Law Center, University of
Florida, Gainesville, Florida; B.A. 1969 Stetson University; J.D. 1972, University of Florida.
***Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Florida; B.A. 1966, University
of the South; Ph.D. 1974, Stanford University.
I Miller, Presidential Power to Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in Constitu-
tional Decision Making, 43 N.C.L. Rav. 502 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
2 See notes 12-33 infra and accompanying text.
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reached a stage at which any party found litigation either necessary
or desirable. In the 1970's, however, courts were drawn into the
conflict. Legal philosophers had long acknowledged the political role
of the courts, and judicial involvement in impoundment provided
further evidence of this fact.3 But the current role of the courts in
the budget is unique.4 Previously, the budget process had been
solely a matter between Congress and the Executive;' the impound-
ment controversy has revealed, however, that agreement between
the Executive and Congress cannot always be achieved.' When there
is an impasse, the role of the courts becomes crucial.
Impoundment, when taken to court, raises most difficult ques-
tions of judicial review and judicial restraint,7 for it requires the
courts to define the relative scope of executive and congressional
authority in an area lacking explicit constitutional guidelines. In
this ambiguous and unfamiliar setting the courts have become ac-
tive participants in the impoundment controversy. Without dispute
impoundment in its broadest sense occurred for many years before
the Nixon Administration,' yet political institutions other than the
courts previously acted as the forum in which the release of funds
was sought. Courts became involved only after continued failure of
other institutions to settle the dispute.
3 See Miller, supra note 1, at 515-16, 537.
Never before have courts become involved as directly in determining the expenditure
of appropriated funds. The unimpoundment phase of the budget is the only stage in which
the courts have thus far become involved; however, the new budget act may compel courts
to become involved with requiring reporting of deferrals, etc. See notes 106-07 infra.
- See notes 12-33 infra. In the early days of the republic, long before the existence of a
budget, Congress appropriated separately to various branches of Government. L. FisHER,
Psn)T AMD CONGRESS 85-90 (1972). Yet even at an early date tension existed between the
executive branch and Congress over spending. Witness the continuing conflict between Secre-
tary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton and the Congress.
I The President has charged the Congress with being "spendthrifts." Joint Hearings on
S.373 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment of Funds of the Senate Comm. on
Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 239-40 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
They have in turn charged the President with unconstitutionally attempting to usurp their
"power of the purse." Id. at 4-6. The result was an impasse.
See notes 42-77 infra.
'See Williams, The Impounding of Funds by the Bureau of the Budget, reprinted in
Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds Before the Subcomm. on Sepa-
ration of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 378 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings]; Levinson & Mills, Impoundment: A Search for Legal
Principles, 26 U. FiA. L. Rxv. 191, 198-99 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Impoundment: Legal
Principles].
UNIMPOUNDMENT
Finally, in 1974 the impoundment controversy in Train v. New
York reached the Supreme Court The Court's acceptance of cer-
tiorari in Train v. New York and its decision overturning the im-
poundment are the ultimate recognitions of the courts' role in the
budget process. If the expenditure of funds is an implementation of
law and, therefore, a reflection of national policy, the courts appar-
ently now feel a responsibility to interpret and define that policy.
Courts are being asked to enforce government expenditures, and the
trend has been to uphold the claims of those seeking unimpound-
ment.0
New legislation has recently been enacted which formalizes the
procedures for impounding and unimpounding-the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.11 These procedures
will be examined as will some of the major circumstances which led
to their passage. Finally, the likely future of such methods under the
new Act will be assessed.
UNIMPOUNDING PRIOR TO COURT INVOLVEMENT
In the first two years of the Nixon Presidency and in previous
administrations, efforts to unimpound funds were channeled
through non-judicial political processes; these can be defined as
efforts by an individual or by groups to obtain the expenditure of
congressionally authorized funds in the face of executive branch
refusal to expend such funds. "Frozen funds" have been released
on numerous occasions when adverse political or economic reaction
to impoundments has become excessive in the opinion of executive
branch officials.
For example, in January, 1972, the Rural Electric Cooperative
Association and its supporters were successful in obtaining the re-
lease of $109 million in frozen funds intended for rural electrification
'Train v. New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975).
,0 See L. FsHER, COURT CASES ON hrPOUNDMENr OF FUNDS: A PUBuc PoucY ANALYSIS
(Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, multilith, Mar. 15, 1974).
" Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-344 (July 12,
1974), 88 Stat. 297.
11 The definition for "impoundment" itself has been elusive. We adopt the definition that
an impoundment results when any type of executive action or inaction precludes or delays
the obligation or expenditure of any part of authorized budget authority. See Impoundment:
Legal Principles, supra note 8, at 192, 193.
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loans. 3 In the same year, the National Limestone Institute and
other concerned associations were able, through the help of Secre-
tary of Agriculture Earl Butz, to obtain the release of $55 million
for the Rural Environmental Assistance Program.'4 This practice of
releasing impounded funds because of political pressure is not a
recent development. As early as 1942, the Bureau of the Budget
released $513,000 for an Oklahoma flood control project after pres-
sure was applied by Senators Lee and Thomas of Oklahoma and
Senator McKellar of Tennessee.'5 In 1943, the Bureau released
$800,000 for Nevada airports because of political pressure from Sen-
ator McCarran.'5 Dr. Louis Fisher reports similar events during the
Johnson Administration:
Political pressures have sometimes been enough to pry loose
impounded funds. After the November 1966 elections, Presi-
dent Johnson announced a $5.3 billion reduction in Federal
programs. Economic and legal justifications presented by the
Administration failed to placate the localities affected by the
cutbacks. Sensitive to criticism from the states, President
Johnson released some of the money in February 1967, and on
the eve of a conference the next month with governors he re-
leased additional amounts.
These unimpoundments were accomplished through political
pressure exerted by both ad hoc and existing groups, some of which
will subsequently be discussed.'" The process of getting impounded
funds released exemplifies the political bargaining process. Accord-
ing to one Nixon Administration official, some leeway was allowed
for programs in which cuts generated political costs that were too
great or where the parties successfully bargained. In such cases,
funds were released in a process termed "fine tuning."" Those seek-
,3 Interview conducted by one of the authors with the staff of the Rural Electric Coopera-
tive Association. This interview was one of several conducted with various interest groups
June 12-14, 1973, in Washington, D.C.
" Interview conducted by one of the authors with the staff of the National Limestone
Institute in Washington, D.C., June 12-14, 1973. This interview was one of several conducted
with various interest groups.
15 Williams, supra note 8, at 384-86.
11 Id. at 386-87.
1' L. FisHER, PNaEsmFT AND CoNomEss 126 (1973).
1" Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June 12-
14, 1973.
"1 Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June 14,
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ing release of funds vary from congressional leaders to organized
interest groups, individual Congressmen, citizens, governors, may-
ors, or even an agency itself which wants more money from the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 0 Since unimpoundment
is political, the relative political bargaining power of the party seek-
ing the release is the central factor in predicting success. Several
techniques utilized by those seeking unimpoundment will now be
considered.
Methods of Unimpounding
Organized interest group representatives or individual citizens
have often telephoned or visited an agency which administered the
program affected by an impoundment in an effort to get the funds
restored.2" While some lobbyists have expressed the view that such
action is of little help since the power to restore cuts lies in the OMB
rather than in the agencies, others feel it is valuable to contact the
agency first to gain information before approaching the OMB. Offi-
cials of one local New York City agency supported by federal funds
reported taking busloads of community people to the office of the
Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare to stage a "sit-in" pro-
testing the impoundment of funds." These officials noted that such
actions were not as successful in the Nixon Administration as in
previous administrations in light of the possibility of very strong,
direct police reaction. The possibility that people may get hurt was,
according to these officials, a change from the 1968-69 period.
Attempts to unimpound funds have sometimes focused on the
OMB. Visits and phone calls have been made to explain the conse-
quences of the cutbacks and to explore the possibility of restoration
of funds. Some lobbyists have complained of difficulty in gaining
access to OMB officials, 23 however, and others claim that even when
OMB officials have been contacted, few results have been gained.
Additionally, according to one Nixon Administration official,
20 Confidential interviews conducted by the authors in Washington, D.C., June 12-14,
1973 and in New York City, April 23-25, 1973.
21 Id.
22 Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in New York City, April 23,
1973.
2 Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June 13,
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Domestic Council members have been importuned to release funds
by interest groups and by Washington lawyers.24 Interviewed lobby-
ists also indicated that unimpounding efforts were sometimes di-
rected to Domestic Council personnel, such as former director John
Ehrlichman.2s Such appeals have sometimes been partly or com-
pletely successful.
Members of Congress have often been requested to assist in efforts
to get funds released.2" Constituents and interest groups have asked
Representatives and Senators to call or visit agency officials, OMB
personnel, or 'Domestic Council members. Further, interested par-
ties have lobbied Congressmen for legislation which will free specific
funds or curtail executive impoundment powers in generalY Some
interest groups have made use of legislative rallies in their efforts
to unimpound funds. Members of such associations have been
brought in from around the country to talk with their Congressmen.
The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association has used the
tactic of the legislative rally in a particularly sophisticated manner.
The Washington headquarters staff of the Association visited Dem-
ocratic members of Congress before the rally to solicit their support
in obtaining the release of loan funds for rural electrification. Then,
the national headquarters relied on the state associations to bring
members of the rural electric cooperatives to Washington to see
their Republican Senators and Representatives. The state associa-
tions were careful to include among the constituents Republican
state and congressional district chairmen who contacted Republican
congressional leaders such as Senators Robert Dole, Hugh Scott,
and Roman Hruska, and then-Representative Gerald Ford. After
the rally, these Republican leaders applied pressure on the White
24 Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June 14,
1973.
2 Confidential interviews conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June
13-14, 1973.
11 Confidential interviews conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June
12-14, 1973.
2Id.
2Id. A legislative rally is a gathering of association members in one place for the purpose
of contacting legislators and thereby affecting public policy. Association members meet with
each other to discuss strategies and purposes and then contact legislators. A legislative rally
may be held at the state level to influence state legislators or in Washington to influence
members of Congress.
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House to get the funds released; as a result, $109 million of an
impounded $216 million was unfrozen.29
Congress itself has occasionally obtained the release of im-
pounded funds by holding other funds desired by the President. For
example, a congressional committee or sub-committee may delay an
appropriation bill until impounded funds are unfrozen. The Foreign
Assistance Act of 1971 is an example of congressional efforts to
release frozen funds through the legislative process; the Act makes
the obligation or expenditure of funds available under the Foreign
Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1971 explicitly
contingent upon release of certain impounded funds."
Interest groups have often cooperated with each other in attempts
to unfreeze impounded funds by the formation of clearing houses
and coalitions. One example is the Rural Impoundment Clearing
House, an ad hoc subcommittee associated with the National Farm
Coalition. Members of this organization include the National Farm-
ers Organization, the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Associa-
tion, the National Limestone Institute, the National Grange, the
National Farmers Union, and the National Association of Wheat
Growers. Members of such anti-impoundment alliances have met to
discuss and disseminate news concerning impoundments, including
advance leaks of forthcoming freezes." They have also planned
strategies for getting funds unfrozen and, in a cooperative, organ-
ized manner, have lobbied the executive and legislative branches for
solutions to their common problems. For example, the National Ad
Hoc Housing Coalition has lobbied for congressionally mandated
Interview conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June 12-14, 1973. The
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association was one of several interest groups whose
staffs were interviewed by one of the authors.
- Pub. L. No. 92-226 (Feb. 7, 1972), § 658(a), 86 Stat. 20, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM. NEws 37.
Sec. 658(a). Except as otherwise provided in this section, none of the funds appro-
priated to carry out the provisions of this Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act shall
be obligated or expended until the Comptroller General of the United States certi-
fies to the Congress that all funds previously appropriated and thereafter im-
pounded during the fiscal year 1971 for programs and activities administered by or
under the direction of the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
have been released for obligation and expenditure.
11 Confidential interviews conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June
12-14, 1973.
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spending measures, supported the Ervin anti-impoundment bill,
lobbied the OMB, talked with White House staff members, and met
with departmental secretaries.32 These formal coalitions have not
included all of the groups that have actually worked for the release
of frozen funds. Other groups, although not formal members, have
often cooperated with the coalitions in unimpounding attempts.3
In some states, the governor has been the focal point for political
unimpoundment efforts. New York State is an example. According
to one New York City government official, attempts to unfreeze
impounded funds from the national government had to be chan-
neled through then-Governor Nelson Rockefeller. 4 This official said
he knew of several specific projects that were taken off a moratorium
on spending, because, he had been told, "someone got to the Gover-
nor." Another city official claimed that New York State, under
Governor Rockefeller, had much more luck in getting federal funds
unfrozen than did New York City under Mayor Lindsay.
Influence of Elections and Political Friendships in Unimpoundment
The political nature of the unimpoundment process is especially
clear when consideration is given to the role of elections and politi-
cal friendships in the process. An officer of a national interest group
which has been successful in obtaining the release of impounded
funds was asked whether unimpoundments are related to political
elections. He replied:
Yes, they a're connected. The election in 1972 was related to the
release of the $109 million we got unfrozen. The funds were
released in January [of 1972]. [Secretary of Agriculture]
Butz left the door open for further releases at our national
convention [where Butz spoke].35
An official of another national interest group association attributed
2 Interview conducted with the staff of a member organization of this Coalition by one
of the authors in Washington, D.C., June 12-14, 1973. This organization was one of several
whose staffs were interviewed.
3 Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June 12,
1973.
11 Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in New York City, April 25,
1973.
' Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June 12,
1973.
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the success of some unimpoundment efforts in 1971 to the fact that
there was to be a presidential election in the following year.36
Both of these lobbyists seemed to feel that the release of im-
pounded funds was viewed by the Nixon Administration as an effec-
tive campaign device. Louis Fisher has also pointed out that unim-
pounding is at times related to elections:
In the fall of 1970 it was learned that the Nixon Administra-
tion planned to withhold some education funds. Criticism
began to build up in Congress and in the school districts. Two
weeks before the November elections the Administration an-
nounced that the money would be released. When the Secre-
tary of Health, Education and Welfare was asked whether the
pending elections had prompted the Administration to reverse
its position and release the funds, he replied, smiling, that
there was "no connection whatsoever."37
The release of impounded funds has been used to reward political
allies. One Washington lobbyist, pointing to Philadelphia's success
in obtaining the release of $10 million in urban funds, suggested that
the sole motivation for such a release was the close political rela-
tionship between President Nixon and Mayor Rizzo.3" The New
York City official who claimed that it was necessary to channel
unimpoundment efforts in the state through former Governor Rock-
efeller stated that Rockefeller's influence in this area was based on
his help to President Nixon during the 1972 presidential election.
Attempts to unimpound had to go through the governor "because
he delivered New York."
This official also discussed the increasing politicization of the
unimpoundment process:
Before the recent [housing] moratorium, only a few cases
of unimpounding were highly political in nature. [By "highly
political" he meant that White House involvement was en-
countered.] Unimpoundment was an administrative, substan-
tive matter. Now there is little substantive discussion. Politici-
Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C., June 14,
1973.
11 FISHER, PREsmEr AND CONoRESS 126 (1972).
Is Confidential interview conducted by the staff of the McIntosh Foundation Executive
Impoundment Project on June 22, 1973.
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zation is the rule rather than the exception. Politics was only
part of the process of unfreezing the funds before the morato-
rium; politics is nearly the whole thing now."
There has been considerable variation in the success of unim-
pounding efforts. Some groups have been highly successful while
others have met with partial or total failure. Circumstances at the
time of such efforts also affect success; the difficulty of unimpound-
ing funds may vary with the particular administration or by time
phases within each administration." In sum, the success of a group
or individual in non-judicial unimpounding efforts depends upon
various factors including the particular lobbying techniques, the
general political influence of the group, and the timing of the at-
tempt.
1971: A Change of Strategy and Forums
In 1971, a major strategic change occurred in efforts to obtain
release of impounded funds. The arena of the controversy was ex-
panded to include the federal courts; litigation became a new unim-
poundment weapon. Why was there resort to the courts in 1971
when there had been none previously? The answer is two-fold. The
first reason is that non-judicial unimpoundment efforts were fre-
quently proving to be unsuccessful or only partly successful; the
courts were used in frustration. The second reason is that the total
impact of Nixon Administration impoundments was different from
the impact of impoundments of previous administrations. The cru-
cial distinction between the impoundment policies of the Nixon
Administration and previous administrations was not to be found
in any single factor but rather in the impact of a combination of
factors. The Nixon Administration openly and aggressively used
impoundment as a policy tool on an extensive scale in the domestic
area for purposes unrelated to war-making capability.4' Nixon Ad-
ministration impoundments were often permanent and frequently
terminated or severely restricted entire projects rather than merely
reducing their levels.
u Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in New York City, April 25,
1973.
4 Id.
" See OMB Report Under Federal Impoundment & Information Act, 39 Fed. Reg. 7707
(1974). The preponderance of impoundments occurred in the domestic arena.
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The severe consequences of such policies in part resulted in resort
to the courts. This aggressive stand on impounding occurred at a
time when Congress and the executive branch were in conflict over
the extent of executive power in other areas. This conflict was aggra-
vated because many of the impounded programs had been popular
ones with great political support. These characteristics taken collec-
tively distinguished the Nixon Administration's impoundment poli-
cies from those of previous administrations. The greater impact of
the Nixon Administration impoundments and the frequent lack of
success in getting these funds released by the usual political meth-
ods led to efforts to involve the courts.
RESORT TO THE COURTS
In the face of a long history of resolution of budget controversies
through non-judicial political pressure and bargaining, the first
steps seeking judicial alternatives were tentative. Those seeking
redress through the courts must have realized that they were em-
barking on an expensive, time-consuming course. The first major
cases were filed in 1971 before the issue of impoundment had
reached the scale of a national controversy, one by Missouri,42 and
another by the San Francisco Housing Authority." The San Fran-
cisco action proved unsuccessful and was dismissed on the basis of
sovereign immunity." While the San Francisco Housing Authority
case failed, the Missouri suit against the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, State Highway Commission v. Volpe," was to become both the
first appellate court decision on impoundment and the first to over-
rule an impoundment. The Volpe court avoided any constitutional
interpretation and emphasized that the decision was based on a
42 State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1124 (8th Cir. 1973).
'3 Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also San Francisco
Redevelopment Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971). These were the first
decisions treating impoundment, as such, in detail.
" One case decided in California in 1971 related to impoundment but was dismissed on
sovereign immunity grounds without thorough treatment of the spending issue. San Francisco
Redevelopment Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Other cases are cited
as bearing on the issue of spending authority but were not truly cases involving the issue of
presidential impoundment but merely the payment of prior governmental obligations. See
United States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840);
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). See also Impoundment:
Legal Principles, supra note 8, at 215-16.
" State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
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statutory direction of Congress rather than a renunciation of presi-
dential constitutional prerogatives.46
The Volpe case was argued and decided just as the political con-
troversy over impoundment was quickening and it was becoming
apparent that traditional means of unimpoundment would not be
successful." The series of impoundments announced at the begin-
ning of January 1973 made itapparent that cooperation was not
forthcoming." Indicative of the increasing breakdown in political
rapport, twenty-three Senators and Representatives joined as ami-
cus curiae in the Volpe appeal to the Eighth Circuit." Shortly fol-
lowing the impoundment hearings conducted by the two Senate
committees in February-which provided further evidence that the
Administration did not intend to cease impounding," the Volpe
decision was issued. It was then firmly established that the im-
poundment conflict would involve the courts.
The Barriers to Court Intervention
Prior to the initial impoundment cases, speculation on whether
courts would decide the impoundment issue centered around the
doctrines of political question and sovereign immunity. Professor
Arthur Miller discussed the political question barrier to judicial
resolution of impoundment in 1965 5-long before impoundment
became a national controversy. He viewed the doctrine as one of
judicial self-restraint and concluded that an impoundment case was
not a proper instance for the exercise of restraint since "it is a
conflict among those very political branches of government that
would answer the question otherwise."53 The Supreme Court has
enumerated six specific criteria which may preclude a court from
hearing a case because it involves a political question. More recent
' Id. at 1106.
See testimony of Roy Ash and Joseph T. Sneed, 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 269,
481, 344, 358.
"These extensive impoundments were reported in February. OMB Report Under Fed-
eral Impoundment. & Information Act, 38 Fed. Reg. 3473-96 (1973).
" Brief of Appellee, State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
0 See 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 269-73 (testimony of Roy Ash), 358-62 (testimony
of Joseph T. Sneed).
5, State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
52 See Miller, supra note 1, at 517.
3Id.
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The six standards were: (1) textually de-
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Court opinions indicate that the principal considerations will be
whether the issue is committed to a coordinate branch or whether
there are judicially manageable standards." Political question was
strenuously argued by the government in the early days of the im-
poundment controversy. 5
Political Question
The political question argument appears, however, to be basically
unavailable in impoundment cases.57 The courts have uniformly
rejected the arguments of the Executive in this regard. First, the
determination of executive-congressional disputes regarding statu-
tory meaning is not an issue committed to either of these branches
but rather to the judiciary.5 In fact, the judiciary is the only branch
which can resolve such an impasse.5 The determination that the
political question doctrine did not obtain is key to the overall im-
poundment controversy since it signifies the formal entry of the
courts into the dispute. While the courts have always been available
for unimpoundment attempts, in previous administrations the issue
monstrable constitutional commitment to a coordinate political department, (2) lack of judi-
cially discoverable or manageable standards for resolving the issue, (3) the impossibility of
deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion, (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government, (5) an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, and (6) the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1152-54
(2d Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 30-34 (1st Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird,
443 F.2d 1039, 1041-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
1 See Brief of Appellant at 46-52, State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th
Cir. 1973); 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 358-65 (testimony of Deputy Atty. Gen. Joseph
T. Sneed).
11 The argument has been almost unanimously rejected. See, e.g., State Highway
Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1124 (8th Cir. 1973); New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), aff'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975); National Council of Community
Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897, 900-01 (D.D.C. 1973).
11 "[lit is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). "The judicial branch of
the federal government has the constitutional duty of requiring the executive branch to
remain within the limits stated by the legislative branch." National Treasury Employees
Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974); "An agency may not finally decide the
limits of its statutory powers. That is a judicial function." State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe,
479 F.2d 1099, 1124 (8th Cir. 1973). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
' See note 58 supra.
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was resolvable through political exchange between Congress and the
President. When the Executive is extremely reluctant to release
funds in the bargaining process, "[tlo say that the Constitution
forecloses judicial scrutiny in these circumstances is to urge that the
Executive alone can decide what is best and what the law re-
quires.""0 Thus, the courts have recognized that raw power to ac-
complish an impoundment by the Executive was obviously not per
se a "commitment to a coordinate branch" and that refusal of the
courts to intervene on that basis would reflect power, not authority.
Courts have likewise rejected the argument of a lack of judicially
manageable standards in impoundment cases."1 The argument of
the Executive in this portion of the political question doctrine can
be framed as follows: there are no manageable standards for the
courts since impoundment is within the discretion accorded by the
statute at issue.2 It may be possible for Congress to confer total
discretion upon the Executive in spending, in effect allowing ex-
penditures of any amount. Such statutory drafting would be a pro-
per basis for a claim that a political question was involved since the
impact would be conferral of total discretion controllable only by
political pressure. If there is no limit to discretion, then the Execu-
tive obviously cannot exceed its discretion. 3 If there is a limit to
agency discretion, then, according to the Administrative Procedure
Act, courts can review that agency action.64 Thus, courts do have the
11 National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F.
Supp. 897, 900 (D.D.C. 1973).
11 See New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S.
Feb. 18, 1975); Guadamuz v. Ash, 368 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 (D.D.C. 1973).
11 Brief of Petitioner at 41-48, Train v. New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975).
3 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). The
Supreme Court in Volpe considered the statutory exception under section 701 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act to judicial review of agency actions "committed to agency discretion,"
and concluded:
This is a very narrow exception. . . . The legislative history of the Administrative
Procedure Act indicates that it is applicable in those rare instances where "statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply." S.
Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Seas., 26 (1945).
401 U.S. at 410, interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. V, 1964).
" 401 U.S. at 413. Such review falls under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, which provide3 specific standards for review, including in all cases the right to set aside
agency action which is "'arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law'
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power to review agency actions which exceed or abuse statutory
discretion. 5 Only once thus far in impoundment cases has the gov-
ernment argument that a statute was totally discretionary and
should bar judicial review been accepted in the courts."6 On the
basis of statutory interpretation, most courts have overturned im-
poundment actions taken by the Executive as an abuse of discre-
tion.6"
The courts' determination regarding existence of statutory discre-
tion will be determinative of the political question issue. Statutes
found to accord total discretion probably fall within the realm of
political question since there are in effect no standards for review.68
Enactments with no discretion will not be political questions be-
cause standards are explicit."6 Statutes with some discretion present
the greatest problem because the courts must determine, through
statutory interpretation, if they have the ability to establish limits
on the exercise of discretion and, if so, whether that discretion has
been abused. 0 This problem was apparent in Campaign Clean
Water Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,7" when the district court found there was
discretion but that it had been exceeded by impounding 55% of
available funds. The court found that 45% was not an acceptable
commitment of funds (and therefore was an abuse of discretion) but
did not define standards for adequate compliance. 2 The finding of
abuse implicitly reflects a judicial determination that adequate
standards existed for such a finding.
Courts have consistently not accepted the argument that im-
or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural or constitutional requirements." 5 U.S.C.
§§ 706 (s) (A), (B), (C), (D) (Supp. V, 1964).
See note 64 supra.
Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973); New York
v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See note 63 supra.
' See Train v. New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975).
70 Campaign Clean Water v. Train, 489 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 4214
(U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (per curiam).
1' 361 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Va.), modified, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W.
4214 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975).
72 The Supreme Court in fact granted certiorari in both New York v. Train and
Campaign Clean Water, "[b]ecause of the differing views with respect to the proper con-
struction of the Act" in those two decisions, regarding the existence of discretion in the
Administrator to withhold funds.
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poundment is a non-reviewable political question. Thus, the courts
have basically supported Professor Miller's reasoning that failure of
courts to intervene would leave the executive and legislative
branches in irreconcilable conflict over impoundment.73 Failure of
the court to act defers to raw power. As was stated by the court in
National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v.
Weinberger, "[w]hen Congress directs that money be spent and
the President, as Chief Executive, declines to permit the spending,
the resulting conflict is not political."74 As the Supreme Court also
succinctly put it in rejecting the argument that total discretion had
been conferred on the Administration in Train,
We cannot believe that Congress at the last minute scuttled
the entire effort by providing the Executive with the seemingly
limitless power to withhold funds from allotment and obliga-
tion. Yet such was the Government's position in the lower
court-combined with the argument that the discretion con-
ferred is unreviewable.75
The Court rejected both contentions, based on the legislative history
of the statute under consideration.
Sovereign Immunity
The other barrier to court involvement in impoundment contro-
versies was the fact that the party to be sued was the federal govern-
ment, suggesting the defense of sovereign immunity.7 Application
of that doctrine has been increasingly reduced by the courts in the
recent past,7 and many statutes specifically waive sovereign im-
munity.7 Further, sovereign immunity is no bar to what are com-
See note 52 supra.
7' 361 F. Supp. 897, 900 (D.D.C. 1973).
11 43 U.S.L.W at 4212-13.
71 The Justice Department routinely raises the defense. See Hearings on "Sovereign
Immunity" Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-30, 64-75 (1970).
" See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947);
Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Schaffer,
434 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But cf. Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
78 See, e.g., Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-35 (1970). In addition, several courts
of appeals have read an implied waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress in any action to
which the Administrative Procedure Act applies. See Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley
v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc.
v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961).
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monly termed officer suits in which judicial review has been held
available when an officer of the government acts in excess of statu-
tory authority or in an unconstitutional manner. 9 The rationale is
that there is no officer of the federal government who "does not hold
office under the law." 80
The officer suit has, consequently, become the basic vehicle for
impoundment litigation. Only once has sovereign immunity been
found to bar suit and then because the action of the officer was
interpreted to be within the broad discretion of the statute.81 Thus,
the same type of judicial interpretation of statutory language which
But see Warner v. Cox, 487 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1974). Other circuit courts of appeals have
completely rejected such an implied waiver, requiring that the defense of sovereign immunity
be met on traditional grounds. See Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, - U.S. - (1975); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967); Chournos v. United States, 335 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1964);
Cyrus v. United States, 226 F.2d 416 (1st Cir. 1955). There is also a third view in which the
policies behind sovereign immunity may be of sufficient weight to require dismissal of a suit,
even though the Administrative Procedure Act appears to grant review. See Littell v. Morton,
446 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971); Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1969). The
Supreme Court, even when presented with the opportunity to resolve this conflict, has failed
to do so. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
One court of appeals has found a waiver of sovereign immunity where the relevant statute
expressly incorporated the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Schlafly v. Volpe,
495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1974).
11 See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962);
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 331 U.S. 682 (1949); Land v. Dollar, 330
U.S. 731 (1947); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 666, 676 (1868).
The Supreme Court in Larson set forth two explicit exceptions to the general rule of
sovereign immunity which otherwise applies where "the relief sought in a suit nominally
addressed to the officer in relief against the sovereign." 337 U.S. at 687. These rules are:
(1) [Wlhere the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond
those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions.
337 U.S. at 689.
(2) [A Case] in which the statute or order conferring power upon the officer
to take action in the sovereign's name is claimed to be unconstitutional. . . is
beyond the officer's power and is, therefore, not the conduct of the sovereign.
337 U.S. at 690.
There is also an exception to both these exceptions where the relief requested may require
the sovereign to dispose of unquestionably sovereign property. 337 U.S. at 692 n.11. This has
been criticized but has resulted in denial of relief. See, e.g., Gardner v. Harris, 391 F.2d 885
(5th Cir. 1968); cf. Saine v. Hospital Authority, 502 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1974) (remand to
district court to consider whether relief would intolerably burden governmental'function).
The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 676-77 (1868).
8 Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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determines whether there are "manageable standards" in the politi-
cal question area also determines the availability of officer suits."
It appears that the courts' involvement with the preliminary is-
sues of whether they can consider the case (political question) and
whether suit can be brought against the government (sovereign
immunity) is determined primarily by the interpretation of statu-
tory language authorizing a particular program. When Congress and
the President disagree on the meaning of the program, those
branches can no longer satisfactorily cope with the issue. In other
words, when the intent of Congress as manifested by a statute is
challenged by the Executive and when the Congress is powerless to
enforce that statute either through persuasion or pressure, then the
resulting impasse is a matter for the courts. When there is total
disagreement on the meaning of a law between those who wrote it
and those who execute it, the ultimate solution is arbitration by the
judiciary.
Substantive Determination by the Courts to Unimpound
Since the courts are entering a new arena in dealing with the
budget, they have sought to deal with the issues through basic legal
doctrines.1 District courts, courts of appeals, and even the Supreme
Court have avoided determinations on the basis of the Constitution
or economics and instead have based most decisions on well-
established canons of statutory interpretation with which they are
comfortable." Consequently, not only has the interpretation of stat-
utes determined the threshold issues of political question and sover-
eign immunity, but statutory analysis has been the basis of the final
decision of the case. Courts have endeavored to analyze authoriza-
tion and appropriation statutes through standard methods of
interpretation: legislative history, plain meaning, and other
" The Supreme Court did not consider the issue of sovereign immunity in Train v. New
York, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had applied its rule of implied
waiver of sovereign immunity under the Administrative Procedure Act. New York v. Train,
494 F.2d 1033, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The government did not appeal this issue to the Su-
preme Court, but the Court noted that the government conceded that, if there were no
discretion in the Administrator, the district court had jurisdiction to order allotment as a
ministerial act, another exception to the rule of sovereign immunity. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4211 n.7.
Cf. R. PoumD, LEGAL REASONING, ch. 2 (1921).
I" See, e.g., Train v. New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975); State Highway
Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
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doctrines.8 The ultimate goal is to evaluate whether the agency
action is within whatever discretion is conferred by the particular
statute. The courts continually cite statements by congressional
sponsors and from committee reports and other indications of legis-
lative intent. 6 An example is the Train case decided by the Su-
preme Court,8 which dealt with the refusal of the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency to allot six billion dollars
during fiscal years 1973 and 1974 under the Water Pollution Control
Act.88 The cases have centered on the meaning of the budgetary
phase of the Act termed allotment. The administration has argued
that the provision was permissive to allow the refusal while plain-
tiffs seeking the funds have alleged that the provision was manda-
tory. 9 Each side has cited history and logic as supporting its advo-
cated result."
The Supreme Court in Train extensively cited the legislative his-
tory of the Water Pollution Control Act and weighed opposing inter-
pretations of that history. The Administrator alleged that state-
ments by Congressman William Harsha emphasizing "the Presi-
dent's flexibility to control the date of spending"9 indicated the
statute was discretionary, ivhile opponents cited a statement by
Senator Edmund Muskie that "funds must be allocated."92 Other
11 See New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For an enumeration of various
canons of interpretation in impounding cases see Brief for Amicus Curiae Center for Govern-
mental Responsibility, 1-32. Train v. New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975). Some
examples are plain meaning, legislative history, statements of sponsors of bills, favoring of
interpretation which allows operation of all provisions, internal logic of all provisions of a bill.
The more complex statutory arguments, that is, operation of all provisions, and internal logic
require technical analysis of budgetary consequences of various portions of the Act. Other
arguments such as plain meaning and legislative history are based more on statutory wording
and analysis of numerous statements by legislators interpreting the Act and its various
sections. See, e.g. Train v. New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209, 4212-13 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975).
See, e.g., New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
43 U.S.L.W. 4209 (Feb. 18, 1975).
This refusal has generated a number of lawsuits challenging the legality of such an
impoundment. See, e.g., Campaign Clean Water v. Train, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973); New
York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Train v. New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209,
4213 n.15 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (list of Federal cases challenging such impoundments).
11 Except Campaign Clean Water, which alleges that the provision is discretionary but
that the Administrator has abused his discretion. Brief for Respondent, Campaign Clean
Water at 27-41, Train v. New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975).
Brief for Petitioner at 14-30, Train v. New York, 43 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975).
" 118 CONG. REc. H9122 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972).
" 118 CONG. Rac. S18546 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972).
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impoundment decisions have also treated legislative history in
depth.13 The 'Court in Train determined that the allotment provision
was mandatory, stating "[t]he Court of Appeals carefully exam-
ined the legislative history in this respect and arrived at the same
conclusion, as have most of the other courts that have dealt with the
issue."94 By emphasizing the importance of legislative history and
statutory interpretation the Court both continued the trend of lower
court decisions and legitimized statutory analysis as the basis for
future holdings in impoundment cases.
The Constitution in Court Decisions
Determinations by the courts thus far have been made primarily
on the basis of statutory interpretations. The Constitution has not
been the sole basis for any holding although courts have in dicta
stated there was an absence of executive authority to refuse unilat-
erally to spend. 5 The very fact that courts have entered into the
impoundment controversy is, aside from the political importance of
an additional actor in the impoundment conflict, an event of consti-
tutional significance. Rarely has an issue developed that has such
major constitutional import for each bf the three branches. Im-
poundment litigation results in a judicial interpretation of presiden-
tial execution of congressional enactments and consequently is a
determination of the constitutional boundary between the Execu-
tive and Congress with regard to spending power.
The courts are being cast as the final referees in the constitutional
confrontation on impoundment. Congress asserts that it has the
supreme authority in regard to spending, while executive spokes-
men urge that spending or the decision to spend is an executive
function-exclusively under the control of the President. The lat-
ter interpretation is constitutionally invalid, however, in that the
President can control spending only to the extent that his actions
comport with congressional desires as expressed in enacted statutes.
Thus, legislative intent as interpreted by the courts defines the
parameters of executive power. In other words, executive impound-
13 See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973); Local 2677,
AFGE v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973).
11 43 U.S.L.W. at 4212.
1 See Impoundment: Legal Principles, supra note 8, at 193-202.
" See 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 358-62 (testimony of Joseph T. Sneed).
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ment accomplished consistent with congressional intent is constitu-
tional while impoundment which contravenes legislative intent is a
usurpation of the congressional power to legislate.
Lower courts have usually avoided mentioning the Constitution,
and the Supreme Court in Train v. New York continued such a
trend; therefore, the questions of the President's inherent authority
to impound has not been directly addressed by the courts. Infor-
mally, the Executive has urged a constitutional authority to im-
pound even in the absence of statutory authority,97 but no such
direct claims of authority were argued to the Supreme Court.
Rather, the Court limited itself in Train to statutory construction
of the Act. In rejecting the authority of the administration to im-
pound, however, the Court implicitly rejected a constitutional au-
thority to impound. A constitutional decision would have been a
difficult matter for the Court. Too stringent or clear a delineation
of authority could impair the delicate checks and balances between
Congress and the President. Further, little constitutional precedent
exists to aid the Court's interpretation. Only decisions such as
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer" or United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exporting Corp.9 provide much guidance. While
Youngstown dealt with seizure of the steel mills by President Tru-
man and Curtiss-Wright with presidential powers in foreign trade,
each considered the doctrine of inherent authority. Because of these
difficulties, the Court and lower courts are likely to avoid constitu-
tionally based decisions as did the Court in Train.
Only if executive assertions of inherent power are directly ad-
vanced in impoundment cases will the courts be likely to engage in
extensive constitutional analysis. First, of course, the courts would
have to find an absence of authority to impound in the statute in
question. After finding such an absence, courts would then be con-
fronted with a clear-cut assertion of constitutional power, with no
other available source of authority to impound. If this situation
11 President Nixon asserted that the " onstitutional right for the President of the United
States to impound funds. . . not to spend money, when the spending of money would mean
either increasing prices or increasing taxes for all the people . . . is absolutely clear." 9
WEEKLY CO!NIPILA1ON OF PRESmENTAL Doctm mrs 11 (1973). See also 1973 Hearings, supra
note 6, at 270, 369.
23 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
92 229 U.S. 304 (1936).
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eventuates, analysis would focus on the nature of impoundment as
a usurpation of congressional prerogatives to legislate. Impound-
ment is not supported by inherent constitutional authority because
the power to legislate spending policy is in the Congress unless a
veto is sustained. Therefore, where impoundment contravenes con-
gressional policy, that is, when no discretion has been delegated to
impound in the statute in question, the Executive is acting uncon-
stitutionally. This matter of constitutionality has been discussed at
length in the journals, and there is no need to recount in detail that
analysis here.' 0 Uniformly, commentators have reached the conclu-
sion that impoundment in contravention of congressional intent is
analogous to an unconstitutional absolute or item veto and not
within inherent authority of the President. The courts in the future
can be expected to reach a similar conclusion.
Judicial v. 1Von-Judicial Unimpoundment
To understand the comparative consequences of judicial and non-
judicial unimapoundment, court interpretations must be compared
with the bases considered in non-judicial unimpoundment actions.
In non-judicial unimpounding the results depend upon who reaches
whom or who can offer or deny enough to compel the release of
funds."0 ' In the courts the considerations are somewhat more objec-
tive. Therefore, the party with the most power at a particular time,
which in the recent past has clearly been the Executive, would
normally try to keep the unimpoundment process out of the courts
since raw power is not determinative in the judicial process.' 2
The active presence of the courts in the impoundment controversy
changes the political milieu. The need for political bargaining power
"I Abascal and Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and Con-
stitutional Framework, 62 GEO. L.J. 1549, 1566-76 (1974); Fisher, Impoundment of Funds:
Uses and Abuses, 23 BuFFALO L. REv. 141, 143-70 (1973); Levinson and Mills, Impoundment:
A Source for Legal Principles, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 190, 193-202 (1974); Stanton, The Presidency
and the Purse: Impoundment 1803-1973, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 25, 48-50 (1973); Note, Im-
poundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. Rxv. 1505, 1513-16 (1973); Note, Protecting the Fise:
Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, 82 YALE L.J. 1636, 1638-42 (1972).
"I See notes 11-39 supra and accompanying text.
2 As a manifestation of the desire to keep the matter out of the court, the Executive
proposed to the Senate Appropriations Committee that the 1973 Labor-HEW appropriation
contain a provision which would preclude suit on funds impounded during FY 1974. See
Washington Post: Nov. 24, 1973, at Al.
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is dramatically reduced, and individuals without such power may
ask for the release of funds with the threat of suing. The fact that
an individual has sued and may sue again may in itself have an
effect on the way he is treated in funding. 03
Litigation does, however, present problems to those seeking re-
lease of impounded funds. For example, while a non-judicial unim-
poundment can result in a release of funds almost immediately,
litigation takes time, sometimes years."0 4 Further, the courts are
limited in their consideration of an impoundment to legal factors
which have not yet included possible economic effects, actual politi-
cal effects, and the subjective evaluations of the success of a pro-
gram."5 In fact, the courts have said that neither they nor the Exec-
utive can consider the success or failure of a program when making
decisions on termination;0 ' consequently, the only way to stop a
program solely on the basis of its failure is through congressional
acquiescence.
It therefore appears that litigation is a more viable alternative to
parties with less political influence while powerful lobbying groups
could sometimes obtain release of funds more expeditiously and
with less expense through exerting political pressure outside the
courts. New legislation may modify tactics slightly, but the same
basic alternatives will be under consideration.
UNIMPOUNDMENT UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974
In July 1974, the President signed the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974,117 a measure passed in large part
MI t is reported that Congressman Fred Rooney (D. Pa.), who was plaintiff in a suit for
impounded funds, had few impoundments occur subsequently in his district, at least during
the Nixon Administration. Interview, William Kovacs, Legislative Assistant to Congressman
Rooney.
,"I Clean Water Act funds were impounded in January, 1973, and were not released while
the case was pending before the Supreme Court, until the decision in February, 1975.
10 See State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1114 (8th Cir. 1973). The court
stated that factors such as inflation were irrelevant considerations in cutting a program. But
see, Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Lynn, the court held that failure
of a program to accomplish its purpose was cause for termination.
M E.g., Local 2677, AFGE v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973).
"0 Pub. L. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (hereinafter referred to as Impoundment Control Act
§ 1001 et seq.).
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to establish congressional control over impoundments and to pro-
vide institutionalized mechanisms for unimpoundment. The Act
will affect unimpoundment in two significant ways: it will perpetu-
ate the role of the courts,"' and it will provide Congress with direct
authority to unimpound. 119
Seeking a broad definition of impoundment to insure wide appli-
cation, the authors of the new budget bill invented the term "defer-
ral." Deferrals as defined in the Act include:
(A) withholding or delaying the obligation or expenditure of
budget authority (whether by establishing reserves or other-
wise) provided for projects or activities; or (B) any other type
of executive action or inaction which effectively precludes the
obligation or expenditure of budget authority, including the
authority to obligate by contract in advance of appropriations
as specifically authorized by law."'
This definition is designed to include all possible impoundment
actions taken by the Executive. The reason for the broad definition
is that impoundment reports currently submitted to Congress by
the OMB list only reserves, thus failing to include many withhold-
ings accomplished by techniques other than reserving which still
result in funds not being expended."' A primary example is the
failure to report six billion dollars which the President ordered the
Environmental Protection Agency not to allot."'
Under the new law, the President is required to transmit a mes-
sage to Congress on each proposed deferral (which can be proposed
for no longer than one fiscal year).113 Either house may pass an
"impoundment resolution" disapproving such deferral at any time,
and the President is thereupon required to make the budget author-
' The Impoundment Control Act expressly provides that it will not affect the claims or
defenses of any litigants, and it also expressly authorizes the Solicitor-General to bring suit
to "require. . . budget authority to be made available for obligation." Impoundment Control
Act §§ 1001(3), 1016.
,"I Congress may, by a resolution of either house, overrule a "deferral" (i.e., an impound-
ment) made by the President. Impoundment Control Act'§ 1013.
11 Impoundment Control Act § 1011(1)(A), (B).
H. Rep. No. 93-658, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1973).
1 See OMB Report under Federal Impoundment & Information Act, 39 Fed. Reg. 7707
(1974).
113 Impoundment Control Act § 1013(a).
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ity available for obligation.1 1 4 The override provision is subject to
criticism in that it permits either house to override a deferral al-
though the other house may take a contrary view. Thus, one house
can by itself prevail over the wishes of the President and the other
house.
Another questionable result of the delegation of override power is
that either house may override any deferral even if the deferral is
authorized by the Anti-Deficiency Act.11 5 The Anti-Deficiency Act
authorizes the Executive to reserve for savings and to prevent waste
as long as reserves do not substantively affect the purpose of an
appropriation."' The Act stated:
• . . reserves may be established to provide for contingencies,
or to effect savings whenever savings are made possible by or
through changes in requirements, greater efficiency of opera-
tions, or other developments subsequent to the date on which
such appropriation was made available. 7
Obviously, the "other developments" provision was rather loose lan-
guage which might conceivably justify reserving for varied purposes.
For example, Roy Ash, former OMB Director, stated in testimony
before a Senate Committee in 1973 that "other developments"
could include inflation.118 To prevent further confusion as to the
meaning of the Anti-Deficiency Act, the new Budget Act amends
the reserving provisions by deleting the phrase "other develop-
ments," thus closing one of the major loopholes in a statute which
allowed impoundment. 9 Therefore, reserves are authorized only in
limited instances to effect savings or provide contingencies. Yet
under the new Act, one house can prevent such savings by overrul-
ing any deferral.
The creation of "deferral" and its definition are obvious attempts
"I Impoundment Control Act § 1013(b).
15 31 U.S.C. § 665(c), as amended (Supp. 1975). The Impoundment Control Act ex-
pressly requires deferrals under the Anti-Deficiency Act to be reported as deferrals under the
new Act. Impoundment Control Act § 1002.
116 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2), as amended (Supp. 1975); See Impoundment: Legal Principles,
supra note 8, at 203-04.
"7 31 U.S.C. § 665(c), as amended (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
"' 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 528, 529 (testimony of Roy Ash).
"' Impoundment Control Act § 1002, amending 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1954), as amended
(Supp. 1975).
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to close a loophole in reporting procedures under which many im-
poundments went unreported because of the absence of a functional
definition of impoundment. All non-spending actions, except "res-
cissions," will be reviewed under the deferral procedures because of
the broad definition of deferrals.'20 Rescissions, which had been pro-
vided for in the Anti-Deficiency Act' prior to the recent Act, will
allow the Executive to propose permanent termination of expendi-
tures on a given program. 1' The procedure is distinct from deferrals
in that the rescission does not go into effect prior to congressional
approval and that Congress must approve the proposed rescission
in forty-five days or it will be deemed rejected. '
The new deferral procedure may also have created problems in
program management. In the first place, Congress has by the Bud-
get Reform Act delegated authority to the President to impound
for an unspecified period of time less than one year.2 4 During con-
gressional consideration of impoundment resolutions, the President
can in fact accomplish an impoundment by temporarily stopping or
scaling down programs. Even if such programs are started up again
or restored to the original level of activity, there can be negative
effects. The uncertainty of funding increases the difficulty of main-
taining competent personnel to operate programs. Agency employ-
ees may be let go because of lack of funds or may leave on their own
for positions with greater funding security. If they cannot be con-
vinced to return to an agency which has had impounded funds re-
stored, their training and experience have been lost to that agency.
There are also costs in the sense that many clients of an agency
may be discouraged and disillusioned by the temporary loss of serv-
ices (such as health services, for example) and will not quickly re-
turn to the agency for those services. The usefulness of services that
were previously rendered may thus be undermined. Time may be
required before an agency returns to an efficient level of operation
characterized by an adequate, experienced staff and a clientele that
makes full use of an agency's services. A "stop and start" approach
'12 Impoundment Control Act § 1013.
121 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1954).
'2 Impoundment Control Act § 1012(a).
'm Impoundment Control Act § 1012(b).
121 Impoundment Control Act § 1013.
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to funding will not be costless. Programs will be disrupted even if
Congress overrides presidential deferrals.
Unimpoundment in the Courts Under the New Budget Act
In the new Budget Act Congress, for the first time, has granted a
direct power to litigate the impoundment issue although the grant
extends only to the Comptroller General. ' The provision allows the
Comptroller General to sue to enforce impoundment provisions of
the Act with counsel of his own choosing. Prior to suit the Comptrol-
ler General must give Congress twenty-five days notice of intent to
sue.12
During the impoundment controversy the most common litigants
have been states and specific recipients of benefits, but in the new
Budget Act no specific provision is made for suits by these parties.
Section 1001 of the Act does, however, state: "Nothing contained in
this Act or in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed
as . . .affecting in any way the claims or defenses of any party to
litigation concerning any impoundment." '127 Nowhere in the legisla-
tive history is there further explanation of this provision. However,
Senator Ervin stated:
The Comptroller General will be granted authority to sue in
the Fderal [sic] District Court for the District of Columbia to
enforce the provisions of the title .... This authority is not
intended to infringe upon the right of any other party to
initiate litigation .... 12
Further, the Act contains a provision which states that the Act will
have no effect on required budgetary actions"2 9 and, therefore, pre-
"2 Impoundment Control Act § 1016.
Id. The Comptroller General is also required to advise Congress regarding the legality
and policy aspects of each proposed deferral. Impoundment Control Act § 1011. Further, if
the Comptroller finds that an action or inaction constitutes a reserve or a deferral that has
not been reported to Congress, he shall himself make the report which will enable Congress
to follow through the appropriate procedures. Impoundment Control Act § 1017(a).
I" Impoundment Control Act § 1001(3).
'1 120 CONG. REc. S11222 (daily ed. June 21, 1974).
"I Pub. L. No. 93-344 § 1001.
Sec. 1001. Nothing contained in this act, or in any amendments made by this Act,
shall be construed as -. ...
(4) Superseding any provision of law which requires the obligation of budget
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sumably would allow enforcement by the courts of those mandatory
provisions. Consequently, the courts in their statutory interpreta-
tion of these provisions will probably utilize the same standards for
decisions developed in recent impoundment cases discussed
above. 3 ' Thus, the precedents of the last two years will continue to
be relevant to cases arising under the new Act.
A question likely to be raised regarding litigation by private par-
ties and states is whether, because of the new Act, the case is barred
from judicial review by the political question doctrine. The issue
would be whether the Budget Act, by establishing a procedure for
impoundment and unimpoundment,13 ' has constitutionally com-
mitted resolution of the impoundment issue to a coordinate
branch.'3 2 Support for this conclusion can be found in the constitu-
tional power of Congress to designate court jurisdiction. Congress
has broad power to determine what the courts can review. Here,
Congress has directly spoken to the effect that no provision shall
preclude suit. ' Hypothetically, the President could propose a de-
ferral of a program which is mandatory, making such a deferral
illegal under the Budget Act.' A state could then sue for funds
under the Act. During the potential one-year pendency of the de-
ferral before Congress, can a court overrule the impoundment as
illegal or is determination of that issue committed to Congress? The
answer is unclear although it can be logically argued that, since the
Act directly states that nothing in the Act shall be construed as
authority or the making of outlays thereunder.
Executive officials have, because of this provision, interpreted the Budget Act as not granting
authority to counterman mandatory programs. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPER-
ATIONS, SEMINAR ON THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974
CONDUCTED BY THE CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL REsFONSmILrrY, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 57
(Comm. Print 1974).
,31 It is significant that the Supreme Court noted the passage of the Impoundment
Control Act but did not consider that the Act mooted the case before it. Train v. New York,
43 U.S.L.W. 4209, 4211 n.8 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975).
131 See note 101. supra.
132 See notes 47-60 supra for discussion of this aspect of the political question doctrine.
'1 See note 109 supra.
'1' See note 110 supra. As previously stated, impoundments of programs found to be
mandatory have consistently been held to be illegal. See notes 42-94 supra and accompanying
text. The provision in the new Budget Act which states that the Act has no effect on re-
quired budget actions apparently means the Act in no way adds to executive authority
regarding statutes found to be mandatory and consequently a deferral of a mandatory pro-
gram would be illegal.
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affecting the claims of any party, the Act directly precludes the
interpretation of any of its sections to bar claims.135 Therefore, provi-
sions which provide for congressional review of deferrals cannot be
construed to bar action as a "political question" and preclude the
claimaint's action.
Another area in which litigation would seem to remain available
to recipients would be unreported or improperly reported impound-
ments. For example, if a deferral were accomplished without report-
ing it as such it could be said to be illegal; or, if a rescission were
reported as a deferral, the action could be considered an illegal
deferral. 3 1 The Comptroller General would, of course, also have the
opportunity to sue in either of the above instances. 37
Unimpoundment in the Congress Under the New Budget Act
Another potential problem area involves the degree of difficulty
in Congress' overriding presidential deferrals. At one extreme, it
may be much more difficult to override a particular impoundment
limited to a narrow constituency than it would be to override a veto
of an appropriations or authorization bill which deals with broad
categories. The specificity of the deferral may make difficult the
building of coalitions sufficiently large to override these impound-
ments. If this situation were to develop, deferrals could thus be
utilized as an item veto-a power continually rejected by Con-
gress.'38 At the other extreme, a norm of reciprocity could develop
concerning congressional overriding of deferrals. Congressmen,
pushed by constituents and interest groups who know that Congress
now has the formal power to get funds released, might engage in
logrolling on these votes to such an extent that even reasonable
delays of expenditures may prove difficult to sustain. For example,
a federal agency may refuse to begin a project because all submitted
construction bids are considered excessive. The disappointed con-
struction firms could convince their Representative or Senator to
push for a congressional override of the executive branch deferral.
The Congressman might obtain support for this override by promis-
ing his colleagues his support in similar situations.
"I See notes 108-10 supra and accompanying text.
213 Cf. Impoundment Control Act § 1015(a).
01 Impoundment Control Act § 1016. But cf. § 1015(b).
' See Statement by Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, 1973
Hearings, supra note 6, at 101, 110-14.
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Another potential problem is that an impoundment resolution
could be bottled up in committee in spite of the new budget act's
provisions for discharging reluctant committees from further con-
sideration of bills. Committee specialization is an important con-
gressional norm, and in the past discharge procedures have not been
successfully used with any frequency. The discharge provision may
prove to be an ineffective check to committee inaction.
The new role of Congress may make the use of impoundment for
partisan electoral purposes much more difficult. If either chamber
were controlled by the party in opposition to the President, im-
poundments made for partisan purposes might be overridden. If the
President unimpounded funds for some districts or projects for par-
tisan purposes,"'9 the opposition-controlled chamber (or even Con-
gress) might proceed to vote the release of other funds which would
favor its party's electoral chances. The executive branch and the
party in control of that branch no longer have a monopoly on the
use of impoundment.
The new congressional role will also constrain executive impound-
ments in a different manner: the executive branch will want to
choose impoundments that will not be easily overridden in Con-
gress.149 Frequent defeats on impoundments could damage an ad-
ministration's prestige and legislative program. Impoundment deci-
sions will have to be made cautiously, with careful consideration of
congressional reactions.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the new budget act will perpetuate the system of im-
poundment on a basis which will involve political pressures on the
Executive, probably not unlike those discussed as unimpounding
procedures in the past; political pressures on the Congress (probably
similar to pressures brought on the Executive); and ultimately re-
sort to the courts, which now have an institutionalized role in the
" See Executive Session Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities of the Senate, Use of Incumbency-Responsiveness, Program Book 18, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974). These hearings describe the use of the budget and grant programs to advance
the cause of reelection of President Nixon.
"I Confidential interview conducted by one of the authors in Washington, D.C. on June
20, 1973.
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process if pressure fails or a party lacks sufficient influence to pres-
sure either the Executive or Congress.
Regardless of President or party, the process of impoundment and
unimpoundment must now be considered as an integral part of the
budget process. Its existence will ensure its use. While Congress as
a body (or as individual chambers) has obtained authority to unim-
pound, those most tangibly affected, prospective recipients, must
still seek to obtain the release of funds either by influencing the
Executive (and now the Congress) or by bringing legal action to
secure funds authorized by Congress. Thus, the result of the new Act
is increased congressional control over the process of impoundment.
The controls will apparently be exercised in both the Congress and
the courts. The ultimate effect will be to formalize two methods in
the process of releasing funds: one method, similar to the pre-1971
situation, relying on political resolution outside of the courts, and
the second method, used during the 1971-73 period, relying on the
courts for resolution of the controversy.
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APPENDIX
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-
344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974)
TITLE X-IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL
PART A-GENERAL PROVISIONS
DISCLAIMER
Sec. 1001. Nothing contained in this Act, or in any amendments made
by this Act, shall be construed as-
(1) asserting or conceding the constitutional powers or limita-
tions of either the Congress or the President;
(2) ratifying or approving any impoundment heretofore or
hereinafter executed or approved by the President or any other Fed-
eral officer or employee, except insofar as pursuant to statutory au-
thorization then in effect;
(3) affecting in any way the claims or defenses of any party to
litigation concerning any impoundment; or
(4) superseding any provision of law which requires the obliga-
tion of budget authority or the making of outlays thereunder.
AMENDMENT TO ANTIDEFICIENCY ACT
Sec. 1002. Section 3679(c)(2) of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31
U.S.C. 665)," is amended to read as follows:
"(2) In apportioning any appropriation, reserves may be established
solely to provide for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings
are made possible by or through changes in requirements or greater effi-
ciency of operations. Whenever it is determined by an officer designated
in subsection (d) of this section to make apportionments and reapportion-
ments that any amount so reserved will not be required to carry out the
full objectives and scope of the appropriation concerned, he shall recom-
mend the rescission of such amount in the manner provided in the Budget
and Accounting Act, 1921, for estimates of appropriations. Except as spe-
cifically provided by particular appropriations Acts or other laws, no
reserves shall be established other than as authorized by this subsection.
Reserves established pursuant to this subsection shall be reported to the
Congress in accordance with the Impoundment Control Act of 1974."
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REPEAL OF EXISTING IMPOUNDMENT REPORTING PROVISION
Sec. 1003. Section 203 of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act
of 1950 is repealed. -'
PART B-CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED
RESCISSIONS, RESERVATIONS, AND DEFERRALS OF BUDGET
AUTHORITY
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 1011. For purposes of this part-
(1) "deferral of budget authority" includes-
(A) withholding or delaying the obligation or expenditure
of budget authority (whether by establishing reserves or other-
wise) provided for projects or activities; or
(B) any other type of Executive action or inaction which
effectively precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget
authority, including authority to obligate by contract in ad-
vance of appropriations as specifically authorized by law;
(2) "Comptroller General" means the Comptroller General of
the United States;
(3) "rescission bill" means a bill or joint resolution which only
rescinds, in whole or in part, budget authority proposed to be res-
cinded in a special message transmitted by the President under sec-
tion 1012, and upon which the Congress completes action before the
end of the first period of 45 calendar days of continuous session of the
Congress after the date on which the President's message is received
by the Congress;
(4) "impoundment resolution" means a resolution of the House
of Representatives or the Senate which only expresses its disapproval
of a proposed deferral of budget authority set forth in a special mes-
sage transmitted by the President under section 1013; and
(5) continuity of a session of the Congress shall be considered
as broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the
days on which either House is not in session because of an adjourn-
ment of more than 3 days to a day certain shall be excluded in the
computation of the 45-day period referred to in paragraph (3) of this
section and in section 1012, and the 25-day periods referred to in
sections 1016 and 1017(b)(1). If a special message is transmitted
under section 1012 during any Congress and the last session of such
Congress adjourns sine die before the expiration of 45 calendar days
of continuous session (or a special message is so transmitted after
the last session of the Congress adjourns sine die), the message shall
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be deemed to have been retransmitted on the first day of the succeed-
ing Congress and the 45-day period referred to in paragraph (3) of this
section and in section 1012 (with respect to such message) shall
commence on the day after such first day.
RESCISSION OF BUDGET AUTHORITY
Sec. 1012. (a) Transmittal of Special Message.-Whenever the Presi-
dent determines that all or part of any budget authority will not be re-
quired to carry out the full objectives or scope of programs for which it is
provided or that such budget authority should be rescinded for fiscal policy
or other reasons (including the termination of authorized projects or activi-
ties for which budget authority has been provided), or whenever all or part
of budget authority provided for only one fiscal year is to be reserved from
obligation for such fiscal year, the President shall transmit to both Houses
of Congress a special message specifying-
(1) the amount of budget authority which he proposes to be
rescinded or which is to be so reserved;
(2) any account, department, or establishment of the Govern-
ment to which such budget authority is available for obligation, and
the specific project or governmental functions involved;
(3) -the reasons why the budget authority should be rescinded
or is to be so reserved;
(4) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated fiscal,
economic, and budgetary effect of the proposed rescission or of the
reservation; and
(5) all facts, circumstances, and considerations relating to or
bearing upon the proposed rescission or the reservation and the deci-
sion to effect the proposed rescission or the reservation, and to the
maximum extent practicable, the estimated effect of the proposed
rescission or the reservation upon the objects, purposes, and pro-
grams for which the budget authority is provided.
(b) Requirement to Make Available for Obligation.-Any amount of
budget authority proposed to be rescinded or that is to be reserved as set
forth in such special message shall be made available for obligation unless,
within the prescribed 45-day period, the Congress has completed action on
a rescission bill rescinding all or part of the amount proposed to be re-
scinded or that is to be reserved.
DISAPPROVAL OF PROPOSED DEFERRALS OF BUDGET AUTHORITY
Sec. 1013. (a) Transmittal of Special Message.-Whenever the Pres-
ident, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the head of
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any department or agency of the United States, or any officer or employee
of the United States proposes to defer any budget authority provided for a
specific purpose or project, the President shall transmit to the House of
Representatives and the Senate a special message specifying-
(1) the amount of the budget authority proposed to be deferred;
(2) any account, department, or establishment of the Govern-
ment to which such budget authority is available for obligation, and
the specific projects or governmental functions involved;
(3) the period of time during which the budget authority is
proposed to be deferred;
(4) the reasons for the proposed deferral, including any legal
authority invoked by him to justify the proposed deferral;
(5) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated fiscal,
economic, and budgetary effect of the proposed deferral; and
(6) all facts, circumstances, and considerations relating to or
bearing upon the proposed deferral and the decision to effect the
proposed deferral, including an analysis of such facts, circumstances,
and considerations in terms of their application to any legal authority
and specific elements of legal authority invoked by him to justify
such proposed deferral, and to the maximum extent practicable, the
estimated effect of the proposed deferral upon the objects, purposes,
and programs for which the budget authority is provided.
A special message may include one or more proposed deferrals of budget
authority. A deferral may not be proposed for any period of time extending
beyond the end of the fiscal year in which the special messiage proposing
the deferral is transmitted to the House and the Senate.
(b) Requirement to Make Available for Obligation.-Any amount of
budget authority proposed to be deferred, as set forth in a special message
transmitted under subsection (a), shall be made available for obligation if
either House of Congress passes an impoundment resolution disapproving
such proposed deferral.
(c) Exception.-The provisions of this section do not apply to any
budget authority proposed to be rescinded or that is to be reserved as set
forth in a special message required to be transmitted under section 1012.
TRANSMISSION OF MESSAGES; PUBLICATION
Sec. 1014. (a) Delivery to House and Senate.-Each special message
transmitted under section 1012 or 1013 shall be transmitted to the House
of Representatives and the Senate on the same day, and shall be delivered
to the Clerk of the House of Representatives if the House is not in session,
and to the Secretary of the Senate if the Senate is not in session. Each
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special message so transmitted shall be referred to the appropriate com-
mittee of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Each such message
shall be printed as a document of each House.
(b) Delivery to Comptroller General.-A copy of each special message
transmitted under section 1012 or 1013 shall be transmitted to the Comp-
troller General on the same day it is transmitted to the House of Represent-
atives and the Senate. In order to assist the Congress in the exercise of its
functions under sections 1012 and 1013, the Comptroller General shall
review each such message and inform the House of Representatives and the
Senate as promptly as practicable with respect to-
(1) in the case of a special message transmitted under section
1012, the facts surrounding the proposed rescission or the reservation
of budget authority (including the probable effects thereof); and
(2) in the case of a special message transmitted under section
1013, (A) -the facts surrounding each proposed deferral of budget au-
thority (including the probable effects thereof) and (B) whether or
not (or to what extent), in his judgment, such proposed deferral is in
accordance with existing statutory authority.
(c) Transmission of supplementary messages.-If any information
contained in a special message transmitted under section 1012 or 1013 is
subsequently revised, the President shall transmit to both Houses of Con-
gress and the Comptroller General a supplementary message stating and
explaining such revision. Any such supplementary message shall be deliv-
ered, referred, and printed as provided in subsection (a). The Comptroller
General shall promptly notify the House of Representatives and the Senate
of any changes in the information submitted by him under subsection (b)
which may be necessitated by such revision.
(d) Printing in Federal Register.-Any special message transmitted
under section 1.012 or 1013, and any supplementary message transmitted
under subsection (c), shall be printed in the first issue of the Federal
Register published after such transmittal.
(e) Cumulative Reports of Proposed Rescissions, Reservations, and
Deferrals of Budget Authority.-
(1) The President shall submit a report to the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, not later than the 10th day of each month
during a fiscal year, listing all budget authority for that fiscal year
with respect to which, as of the first day of such month-
(A) he has transmitted a special message under section
1012 with respect to a proposed rescission or a reservation; and
(B) he has transmitted a special message under section
1013 proposing a deferral.
Such report shall also contain, with respect to each such proposed
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rescission or deferral, or each such reservation, the information re-
quired to be submitted in the special message with respect thereto
under section 1012 or 1013.
(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be printed
in the first issue of the Federal Register published after its submis-
sion.
REPORTS BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL
Sec. 1015. (a) Failure to Transmit Special Message.-If the Comptrol-
ler General finds that the President, the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, the head of any department or agency of the United
States, or any other officer or employee of the United States-
(1) is to establish a reserve or proposes to defer budget author-
ity with respect to which the President is required to transmit a
special message under section 1012 or 1013; or
(2) has ordered, permitted, or approved the establishment of
such a reserve or a deferral of budget authority;
and that the President has failed to transmit a special message with re-
spect to such reserve or deferral, the Comptroller General shall make a
report on such reserve or deferral and any available information concerning
it to both Houses of Congress. The provisions of this part shall apply with
respect to such reserve or deferral in the same manner and with the same
effect as if such report of the Comptroller General were a special message
transmitted by the President under section 1012 or 1013, and, for purposes
of this part, such report shall be considered a special message transmitted
under section 1012 or 1013.
(b) Incorrect classification of special message.-If the President has
transmitted a special message to both Houses of Congress in accordance
with section 1012 or 1013, and the Comptroller General believes that the
President so transmitted the special message in accordance with one of
those sections when the special message should have been transmitted in
accordance with the other of those sections, the Comptroller General shall
make a report to both Houses of the Congress setting forth his reasons.
SUITS BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL
Sec. 1016. If, under section 1012(b) or 1013(b), budget authority is
required to be made available for obligation and such budget authority is
not made available for obligation, the Comptroller General is hereby ex-
pressly empowered, through attorneys of his own selection, to bring a civil
action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to
require such budget authority to be made available for obligation, and
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such court is hereby expressly empowered to enter in such civil action,
against any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States,
any decree, judgment, or order which may be necessary or appropriate to
make such budget authority available for obligation. The courts shall give
precedence to civil actions brought under this section, and to appeals and
writs from decisions in such actions, over all other civil actions, appeals,
and writs. No civil action shall be brought by the Comptroller General
under this section until the expiration of 25 calendar days of continuous
session of the Congress following the date on which an explanatory state-
ment by the Comptroller General of the circumstances giving rise to the
action contemplated has been filed with the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the President of the Senate.
PROCEDURE IN HOUSE AND SENATE
Sec. 1017. (a) Referral.-Any rescission bill introduced with respect to
a special message or impoundment resolution introduced with respect to
a proposed deferral of budget authority shall be referred to the appropriate
committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate, as the case may
be.
(b) Discharge of Committee.-
(1) If the committee to which a rescission bill or impound-
ment resolution has been referred has not reported it at the end
of 25 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress after
its introduction, it is in order to move either to discharge the
committee from further consideration of the bill or resolution or
to discharge the committee from further consideration of any
other rescission bill with respect to the same special message or
impoundment resolution with respect to the same proposed de-
ferral, as the case may be, which has been referred to the com-
mittee.
(2) A motion to discharge may be made only by an indi-
vidual favoring the bill or resolution, may be made only if sup-
ported by one-fifth of the Members of the House involved (a
quorum being present), and is highly privileged in the House
and privileged in the Senate (except that it may not be made
after the committee has reported a bill or resolution with respect
to the same special message or the same proposed deferral, as
the case may be); and debate thereon shall be limited to not
more than 1 hour, the time to be divided in the House equally
between those favoring and those opposing the bill or resolution,
and to be divided in the Senate equally between, and controlled
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by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their desig-
nees. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not
in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is
agreed to or disagreed to.
(c) Floor Consideration in the House.-
(1) When the committee of the House of Representatives
has reported, or has been discharged from further consideration
of, a rescission bill or impoundment resolution, it shall at any
time thereafter be in order (even though a previous motion to
the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the
consideration of the bill or resolution. The motion shall be
highly privileged and not debatable. An amendment to the mo-
tion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed
to.
(2) Debate on a rescission bill or impoundment resolution
shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided
equally between those favoring and those opposing the bill or
resolution. A motion further to limit debate shall not be debata-
ble. In the case of an impoundment resolution, no amendment
to, or motion to recommit, the resolution shall be in order. It
shall not be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which a
recission (sic) bill or impoundment resolution is agreed to or
disagreed to.
(3) Motions to postpone, made with respect to the consid-
eration of a rescission bill or impoundment resolution, and
motions to proceed to the consideration of other business, shall
be decided without debate.
(4) All appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to
the application of the Rules of the House of Representatives to
the procedure relating to any rescission bill or impoundment
resolution shall be decided without debate.
(5) Except to the extent specifically provided in the pre-
ceding provisions of this subsection, consideration of any rescis-
sion bill or impoundment resolution and amendments thereto
(or any conference report thereon) shall be governed by the
Rules of the House of Representatives applicable to other bills
and resolutions, amendments, and conference reports in similar
circumstances.
(d) Floor Consideration in the Senate.-
(1) Debate in the Senate on any rescission bill or im-
poundment resolution, and all amendments thereto (in the case
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of a rescission bill) and debatable motions and appeals in
connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10
hours. The time shall be equally divided between, and con-
trolled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their
designees.
(2) Debate in the Senate on any amendment to a rescis-
sion bill shall be limited to 2 hours, to be equally divided be-
tween, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the bill.
Debate on any amendment to an amendment, to such a bill, and
debate on any debatable motion or appeal in connection with
such a bill or an impoundment resolution shall be limited to 1
hour, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the
mover and the manager of the bill or resolution, except that in
the event the manager of the bill or resolution is in favor of any
such amendment, motion, or appeal, the time in opposition
thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his desig-
nee. No amendment that is not germane to the provisions of a
rescission bill shall be received. Such leaders, or either of them,
may, from the time under their control on the passage of a
rescission bill or impoundment resolution, allot additional time
to any Senator during the consideration of any amendment,
debatable motion, or appeal.
(3) A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. In
the case of a rescission bill, a motion to recommit (except a
motion to recommit with instructions to report back within a
specified number of days, not to exceed 3, not counting any day
on which the Senate is not in session) is not in order. Debate on
any such motion to recommit shall be limited to one hour, to be
equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the
manager of the concurrent resolution. In the case of an im-
poundment resolution, no amendment or motion to recommit is
in order.
(4) The conference report on any rescission bill shall be in
order in the Senate at any time after the third day (excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) following the day on
which such a conference report is reported and is available to
Members of the Senate. A motion to proceed to the considera-
tion of the conference report may be made even though a pre-
vious motion to the same effect has been disagreed to.
(5) During the consideration in the Senate of the confer-
ence report on any rescission bill, debate shall be limited to 2
hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the
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majority leader and minority leader or their designees. Debate
on any debatable motion or appeal related to the conference
report shall be limited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided
between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the
conference report.
(6) Should the conference report be defeated, debate on
any request for a new conference and the appointment of confer-
ees shall be limited to one hour, to be equally divided between,
and controlled by, the manager of the conference report and the
minority leader or his designee, and should any motion be made
to instruct the conferees before the conferees are named, debate
on such motion shall be limited to 30 minutes, to be equally
divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager
of the conference report. Debate on any amendment to any such
instructions shall be limited to 20 minutes, to be equally divided
between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the
conference report. In all cases when the manager of the confer-
ence report is in favor of any motion, appeal, or amendment, the
time in opposition shall be under the control of the minority
leader or his designee.
(7) In any case in which there are amendments in disa-
greement, time on each amendment shall be limited to 30 min-
utes, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the man-
ager of the conference report and the minority leader or his
designee. No amendment that is not germane to the provisions
of such amendments shall be received.
Approved July 12, 1974.

